Real type ↔ extension
Recognises the format from magic bytes and compares it with the extension (handling aliases like jpeg/jpg).
The File analysis module assembles a file dossier reusing every engine in the app: real type, entropy, strings, executable headers, embedded signatures, fuzzy hash, YARA and C2PA Content Credentials.
Recognises the format from magic bytes and compares it with the extension (handling aliases like jpeg/jpg).
Global and per-block value (sparkline); flags already-compressed formats to avoid false alarms.
Extracts printable strings, including Windows-style UTF-16LE; URLs/emails/IPs highlighted.
PE/ELF/Mach-O: architecture, sections, imports; for PE also imphash and packer detection.
ssdeep to find similar files and comparison against known hash-sets (NSRL-style lists).
Applies YARA rules from an updatable endpoint and reads/validates C2PA Content Credentials.
What an attachment would do if you opened it, without opening it: VBA macros with their source and the procedures that run by themselves (PowerPoint included), Excel 4 macros, remote templates, DDE fields, embedded or linked objects, .lnk shortcuts (command, arguments, origin machine), HTML and SVG pages with forms, redirects and HTML smuggling, RTF with the Equation Editor, scripts with decoded PowerShell commands, files hidden in OneNote, encrypted documents, double extensions.
Severity states the file's capability (“runs code when opened”), not an intent: no judgement of the text, no reputation. The addresses found are listed, never opened. The macro source matches olevba, the reference tool, character by character.
Besides the manifest signature, Probatio recomputes the file hash the manifest declares: a valid signature on a file modified after signing comes out as “does not match”. Cloud manifests included.
For files that contain others — compressed wrappers, OLE documents, ZIP — the full tree of levels, with type, size, entropy, dates and SHA-256 of every element. For each embedded object it recognises the application that created it (for instance a CorelDRAW drawing inside an Outlook oledata.mso), extracts its metadata (author, dates, revision, program) and shows the previews found inside. An “Equation Native” disguised under another class, the Equation Editor exploit route, is a high finding.
EMF/WMF images, also compressed like the image001.emz Outlook attaches, are read record by record in the isolated process, without letting the system draw them: SETABORTPROC, printer escapes, colour profiles on network paths (NTLM leak), malformed records. The visible image is rebuilt from the embedded bitmaps, with its hash.
A button brings the module back to its initial state.