Format and size
Format from magic bytes and real dimensions, including HEIF/HEIC images (from the ispe box).
The Image analysis module breaks a photo down into its technical details: JPEG structure, quantization tables, ICC profile, complete metadata and C2PA Content Credentials, in a PDF report that embeds the image.
Format from magic bytes and real dimensions, including HEIF/HEIC images (from the ispe box).
Structure and parameters for JPEG (encoding, subsampling), HEIF/HEIC (iPhone photos), WebP, TIFF (pages/compression) and GIF (with animation: frames, loop, duration).
Forensic heuristics ELA and multi-quality JPEG Ghost, metadata coherence (editing software, impossible dates) and EXIF thumbnail vs image comparison: signs of retouching or splicing.
DQT tables de-zigzagged in natural 8×8 order — useful to estimate compression and provenance.
ICC color profile (class, space, description) and Photoshop IRB blocks (resolution, copyright, URL).
Derived exiftool-style values: Light Value, 35 mm equivalent, field of view, hyperfocal, depth of field.
All EXIF/GPS/IPTC/XMP metadata, full C2PA and a PDF report with the embedded image.
Every altitude declared in the file, each with its reference: sea level, ellipsoid, the drone's take-off point (DJI, Parrot). If the file does not declare the reference, that is said instead of making it up.
Coordinates also in degrees, minutes and seconds and, next to them, the place name from OpenStreetMap, labelled as indicative, not from the file. To get it, and the map, the coordinates (not the image) are sent to OpenStreetMap; offline they simply do not appear.
The manifest is also checked for its binding to the image bytes; fixed a false “invalid signature” on C2PA 2.x manifests, such as Lightroom's.
EMF and WMF, .emz and .wmz included, open here, also from “Open in” on email attachments. Records are read one by one in the isolated helper, without letting the system draw them, looking for the spots attacks use: WMF SETABORTPROC (CVE-2005-4560), printer escapes, colour profiles and colour spaces on network paths (NTLM credential leak), EMF+ and GDI comments, malformed records. Then the rebuilt image from the embedded bitmaps with its hash, the header, record types, texts and a clear outcome: no findings, medium findings, high findings.